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“And Should the First be Last?”
Malcolm D Evans*
Questions of “Religion and . . .” are prone to generate
controversy. Consider, for example, the so-called “science and
religion” debate, focusing on whether science and religion are
compatible with each other. 1 Juxtaposing religion with something
else immediately tends to summon up a hermeneutic of opposition
which, rather than facilitating an exploration of the relationship at
hand, often has the effect of calling into the question the legitimacy
of there being a relationship at all. Nowhere does this seem to be
truer than in the context of religion and human rights, where the
relationship is so often assumed to be one of contradiction, if not of
outright conflict. 2
From the very outset of its being recognized as a part of the
canon of international human rights law, the freedom of religion has
been the subject of a double pressure, both from within and from
without. From within, it has been under pressure to be aligned with
freedoms pertaining to non-religious forms of belief. 3 The idea that

* Professor of International Law, University of Bristol, UK. This is a lightly reworked text of
an address given at the Brigham Young University Law & Religion Symposium on October 6,
2013, and is based in part on a chapter by the author in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Scott Sheeran & Nigel Rodley eds., 2014).
1. For perhaps the most prominent example of this controversy in popular writing, see
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006), which prompted a series of debates and
responses, including works by ALISTER MCGRATH & JOANNA COLLICUT MCGRATH, THE
DAWKINS DELUSION?: ATHEIST FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE DENIAL OF THE DIVINE (2007);
KEITH WARD, WHY THERE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A GOD: DOUBTING DAWKINS (2008); and
ALISTER MCGRATH, WHY GOD WON’T GO AWAY: ENGAGING WITH THE NEW ATHEISM
(2011).
2. A tendency not limited to those who speak from a position antithetical to religion:
see, for example, the intriguingly titled collection of essays, DOES GOD BELIEVE IN HUMAN
RIGHTS? (Nazila Ghanea, Alan Stephens, & Raphael Walden, eds., 2007).
3. This is reflected in the freedom being cast as the freedom of “thought, conscience
and religion” and that there be protection of manifestations of “religion and belief.” The
European Court of Human Rights has frequently held that article 9 of the ECHR includes
non-religious patterns of belief, commenting that “it is a precious asset for . . . .” Kokkinakis v.
Greece, App. No.14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶ 31 (1993); see also U.N.
Human Rights Comm., 48th session, Gen. Comment No. 22, Art. 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, ¶ 1 (1993).

531

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/10/2015 12:02 PM

2014

religious belief per se should be the subject of particular protections
as a human right has never gained particular traction, and as a result,
the freedom of religion is “internally moderated” by this parallelism
with other forms of “conscience-freedoms.” This tends to mean that,
rather than focusing on freedom of religion itself, attention is more
often focused on the manner in which other human rights ideals—
such as thought, expression, association, equality, and nondiscrimination—find their outworking in the context of religious
belief and belief systems.
The external constraint—the “constraint from without”—is the
view that there is a question mark over the legitimacy of freedom of
religion being protected as a human right at all. It is quite
remarkable that many of those who fervently support it, let alone
those who fervently oppose it, embrace the idea that there is not
only a right to the freedom of religion but also the mirror-image
right (nowhere formally articulated) to the “anti-right”: the right to
be free from religion. 4 It is difficult to think of any other “freedomright” that has an “anti-right” of this nature associated with it in
quite this fashion. For example, the freedom of expression is not said
to imply a right to freedom from expression, or the freedom of
association a freedom from association, etc. 5
To the extent that this means no one ought to be forced into
accepting forms of religion or religious practices, this is (or ought to
be) entirely unexceptional and completely welcome. However, it has
been taken to mean a great deal more than this and reflects the
distinctly cool—and sometimes downright hostile—attitudes which
some (many?) within the human rights community have towards
religion as a human right. Arguably, this has been of relatively little
consequence until quite recently, due to the relative lack of
engagement with freedom of religion by those working within the

4. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 18 (n. 2) ¶ 2: “[A]rticle
18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any
religion or belief.” This is also found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), ¶ 60
(“[A]rticle 9 of the Convention . . . guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
including the freedom not to belong to a religion.”).
5. It is, of course, the case that one cannot be forced to express views one does not
wish to express or associate with people one does not wish to associate with. But this is not the
same as saying that one has the right to be “free” from “expression” or from “association” in
the sense of not being “exposed” to expression or association, and this is the claim that is
indeed sometimes made as regards the freedom “from” religion.
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field of human rights at all. Following 9/11, however, religion has
become a more prominent—and increasingly dominant—feature in
international relations, resulting in a greater politicization of religion
within the human rights field. Some have responded to this by
arguing that in order to return to a “safer” and more secure world, it
is necessary to depoliticize the freedom of religion by returning it to
the obscurity from whence it came. In short, if, in international
affairs and in the human rights sphere, “religion is trouble,” then
“no-religion” is trouble averted.
There is much that could be said against this approach, but
perhaps the most telling objection concerns its underlying premise,
which is that religion is a marginal concept which has attained too
great a prominence within human rights thinking. From a purely
historical perspective, this is quite wrong and it is the opposite which
is the case. Although human rights thinking has become an
increasingly prominent discourse in international affairs over the last
sixty years, it is only in the last ten years—twenty at the most—that it
has taken so central a stage. 6 Across this time, the influence of
religion as an ordering worldview has remained a dominant force,
and perhaps increasingly so. It is the rise of human rights thinking
and its implications for religious thinking, rather than the rise of
religion as a challenge to human rights thinking, that has
accentuated the debate. In short, it is human rights thinking, not
religious thinking, that is the “new kid on the block”—something
that human rights theorists are apt to forget.
Once again, however, perceiving the relationship in this manner
smacks of dualism and clashes of right and wrong, which are not
only unhelpful, but can also become downright dangerous. For
example, I have been party to many serious discussions in which
evidence of egregious violations of basic religious rights of believers
have been countered with examples of situations in which other
religious believers (of either the same or of other faiths) have not
been particularly accommodating of the rights of others—perhaps of
women or of LGBTIs—or have sought to restrict the right of others
to express themselves through the use of blasphemy laws, etc. It is as
if it were acceptable to say: “Yes, we know that group X is being
persecuted for their beliefs. But if we protect group X in the

6. For a perceptive study of why this might be so, see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST
UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
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enjoyment of their religious beliefs, we will be failing to properly
protect the human rights of others because religious believers do not
always respect human rights.” Such logical non-sequiturs and
unproven consequentialism would quickly be rejected in other areas
of human rights thinking: a State is not generally accused of
endorsing criminal conduct or of prejudicing the rights of victims of
crime because of its insistence that those charged with criminal
offences receive a fair trial. It is all the more strange that there should
be such a reluctance to protect the rights of religious believers lest it
be thought that in doing so one is supporting and encouraging their
beliefs. 7 A victim should be seen as a victim—not as a potential
perpetrator.
Be that as it may, mutual doubt and hesitation permeate the
relationship between religion and human rights, and a sense of
dualism pervades the arena. As a result, for many, human rights must
be compatible with their faith, whilst for others it is faith that must
be rendered compatible with human rights. Much of the doctrinal
work in this area—particularly as regards Islam and human rights—
has focused on how religious belief and human rights can be
“reconciled” through the reinterpretation of one’s faith, or by
adhering to strands within one’s faith tradition that accord with
contemporary human rights standards. 8 Yet this process has not only
involved Islam. I would argue that—although it takes a different
form and reflects different historical, political, social, and theological
factors—a similar process is occurring in Europe, focusing on what
might be called the secularizing of the public space. 9 Given the

7. Nevertheless, this is a trap into which courts also fall from time to time. See, for
example, the judgment of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in
Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, where it said that “[t]he Court shares the
Government’s view that acceptance of a poster advertising campaign could suggest that they
are endorsing, or at least tolerating, the opinions and conduct in question.” Mouvement
Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 16354/06, ¶ 52 (Jan. 13, 2011), aff’d 2012-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 373.
8. Of the many works exploring such approaches from a legal perspective see in
particular the work of ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A (2008) and ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SELECTED
ESSAYS OF ADBULLAHI AN-NA’IM (Mashood A. Baderin & Abd Allah Ahmad Naim eds.,
2010). See also MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW
(2003).
9. Of the ever-growing literature on this, see, for example, ROGER TRIGG, RELIGION
IN PUBLIC LIFE: MUST FAITH BE PRIVATIZED? (2007); RELIGION IN A LIBERAL STATE (Gavin
D’Costa, Malcolm Evans, Tariq Modood, & Julian Rivers eds., 2013); ISLAM AND ENGLISH

534

DO NOT DELETE

531

7/10/2015 12:02 PM

“And Should the First be Last?”

nature of western Christian doctrine, the so-called debate about the
role of religion in public life seems to fulfill a function very similar to
the debate concerning schools of interpretation within Islamic
thinking. In both, the central issue is not about secularity, neutrality,
or theological inquiry; it is about forging an approach capable of
resolving the tensions between religion and human rights.
Once again, however, we find ourselves drawn back to the
“religion and . . .” question, which is why both these lines of inquiry,
and others like them, are ultimately so unsatisfactory. This is not to
say that they are unhelpful. Such discussions can be profoundly
helpful in clarifying lines of thinking and the issues that underlie
them. Yet, they can only assist in addressing the “tension” to the
extent that those engaged in the discussions concerning, say, the role
of religion in public life or the acceptability of principles of
theological interpretation continue to share a sufficiency of common
space. One has to have agreement on what constitutes the “public”
as opposed to the “private” sphere; on what falls within the scope of
public life and what does not; 10 on what religious texts are to be
subject to interpretation of whatever nature; and so on, if these
processes are to yield fruit. The real problem, then, lies in the
assumption that ultimately there are limits to the common space
within which shared discourse can generate positive outcomes. If all
one is doing is redefining the parameters of the “problem,” one is
merely relocating the source of future tension, rather than
identifying a means of addressing it.
Need it be this way? It is often overlooked that the originators of
contemporary international human rights thinking—as with so many
other aspects of international humanitarianism—did not only derive
inspiration or motivation from their religious beliefs, but also that
the protection of religious believers originally lay at the heart of the
enterprise. 11 It has also been argued that there is something of the

LAW: RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE PLACE OF SHARI’A (Robin Griffith-Jones ed.,
2013).
10. For example, is buying a postage stamp in a state-run post office to be understood as
a public event? If so, then does the religious clothing worn by the person buying the stamp
become a matter of legitimate public concern?
11. See generally MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN EUROPE (1997). For the interplay between religion and international law more generally,
see MARK W. JANIS & CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004).
For an earlier work predating the “human rights” era on this, see NORMAN BENTWICH, THE
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“religious” about the espousal of human rights, 12 which perhaps
finds some reflection in the contemporary trend towards grounding
both religion and human rights in the concept of dignity. 13 Whatever
one’s view on this, it does offer a different approach to
understanding the relationship between religion and human rights.
Rather than an approach based on identifying a means of
accommodation that is mutually acceptable to the various camps
concerned (which also reinforces the sense of there being a
separation between them, a gulf to cross, a bridge to build), it points
to an approach founded upon their commonalities. This is not to
suggest that religion and human rights are, in some sense, the same.
They are not. But they do share an overlapping function, a shared
concern with how people are to relate to each other within a
governed community. The starting point, then, for a useful
exploration of the relationship between religion and human rights
begins not with religion, nor with human rights, but with
recognition of the contribution each makes to that underlying
common enterprise. That each may seek to do more than that is
neither here nor there.
This is not without implications, the most troublesome of which
might be that it accords legitimacy upon both religion and human
rights and seeks to understand them as operating within a shared
space. It has already been mentioned that this is a claim that many in
religious circles have long denied, and which is still contested by
some religious believers. 14 It is also deeply controversial for many of
RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THROUGH THE AGES (2d ed. 1959).
12. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11–
42 (1998).
13. For a penetrating analysis of this trend, see Christopher McCrudden, Human
Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008).
14. This debate finds reflection in the more general question of “religious autonomy,”
and in particular, the autonomy of religious organizations from the application of general legal
provisions that they consider to be inimical to their religious mission or ethos. Employment
law has proven to be a particular flashpoint, particularly the application of general employment
law frameworks to ministers of religion. Approaches to this continue to oscillate, with the
current trend appearing to be pointing towards enhanced autonomy. See, for example, in the
United States, the Supreme Court judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); in the United Kingdom, the judgment of the Supreme Court
in President of the Methodist Conference v. Preston, [2013] UKSC 29; and before the European
Court of Human Rights, the case of Sindicatul “Påstorul Cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No.
2330/09,
(GC
July
9,
2013),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.c
oe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122763. See generally Ian Leigh, Balancing
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a non-religious persuasion who find it difficult to accept the
rationality or reality of religious belief, and who are not inclined to
accept any implications of religious legitimacy that might have a
material bearing upon them. Yet religion and human rights
demonstrably exist as forces within the shared space of human
governance. The future lies not in trying to understand the one in
terms of the other, but in trying to understand each in terms of each
other: not as forces pulling in opposite directions, but as forces
directed at a common endeavor (albeit not necessarily always doing so
in a mutually supportive fashion and neither of which is immune to
misunderstanding, misapplication or mistake). To borrow and adapt
a phrase, it involves taking religion and taking (human) rights
seriously.
I. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN IN PRACTICE?
In recent times there has been considerable focus on a number of
issues in which there is perceived to be a straightforward “clash”
between the freedom of religion and belief and other rights within
the human rights framework. I want to briefly introduce a number of
headline issues that have caused considerable debate and which
remain ongoing sources of controversy. This will be followed by an
outline of what might be regarded as baseline issues that, whilst
arguably more foundational to the experience of rights holders, do
not seem to be able to gain such traction in the overall debate upon
the subject as the headline issues.
A. The Headline Issues
1. Religion and expression
The interplay between the freedom of religion and belief and the
freedom of expression is a matter of enduring contention. Ever since
the Salman Rushdie affair there has been a tendency to view religion
as a potential gag on expression, an idea reinforced by some of the
responses to the infamous “Danish cartoons.” 15 On the other hand,
some religious believers see the freedom of expression as a vehicle for
Religious Autonomy and other Human Rights under the European Convention, 1 OXFORD J.L.
& RELIGION 109 (2012).
15. For a discussion of the Danish cartoons, see Paul Sturges, Limits to Freedom?
Considerations Arising from the Danish Cartoons Affair, 32 IFLA J. 181, 18–82 (2006).
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pedalling distressingly hurtful comments or attitudes. So under the
European Convention on Human Rights, it has become entirely an
uncontroversial proposition that the exercise of the freedom of
expression might legitimately embrace imparting “‘information’ or
‘ideas’ . . . that offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of
the population,” 16 whilst “[t]hose who choose to exercise the
freedom to manifest their religion . . . must tolerate and accept the
denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by
others of doctrines hostile to their faith.” 17
As interesting as it is that the balance has been struck in this way,
the more important point is that, thus put, it is not difficult to see
why the freedom of religion and/or expression are so often seen as
“rights in collision,” attracting all the attention that attends such
clashes of fundamentals. It is perhaps inevitable that matters
concerning the freedom of expression will attract considerable
publicity. What is not inevitable, but appears to be commonplace, is
for these rights to be portrayed as being at odds with each other.
The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the extent to
which both rights are foundational to the good of democratic
societies; 18 yet rather than engage with each other on this basis when
issues arise, the tendency is to seek to resolve them by attempting to
assert the primacy of one right over the other. This again makes for a
perfect “religion and . . .” question, with the built-in propensity for
controversy which it brings.
2. Religion and symbols
There can be little doubt that one of the most contentious issues
to have been raised before the European Court of Human Rights in
recent times has concerned the presence of religious clothing or
symbols in the educational arena, with key cases dealing with the

16. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 49 (1976).
17. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A), ¶ 47 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49 (“Freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic
conditions for its progress and for the development of every[one].”); See also Kokkinakis v.
Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 31 (1993) (“[F]reedom of
thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the
meaning of the Convention.”).
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wearing of headscarves by students 19 and the presence of religious
symbols in classrooms. 20 The Court’s approach currently oscillates
between focusing upon the potential impact the presence of such
clothing or religious symbols in state institutions might have upon
perceptions of the impartiality of the State in matters of religion or
belief in general, and focusing on the actual impact that the wearing
or presence of such symbols actually has upon the rights of others. In
other words, is it their symbolic significance or their practical impact
that is at the heart of the matter? Put in such terms, it becomes
clearer that the underlying issue runs even deeper and concerns the
place of religion in the public life of the society concerned.
The most significant decision of the European Court on this
question is without doubt Lautsi v. Italy, in which the Grand
Chamber unpicked one of its most serious errors of recent times. In
a string of cases, the Court articulated the proposition that the State,
when exercising its regulatory powers in respect to religious bodies,
was to do so in a neutral and impartial fashion. 21 This became
misunderstood to mean that the state was to be neutral in matters
concerning religion, and thus it was argued that the State ought not
to be seen lending credence to any particular religion by permitting
it to be visible within the State. Such reasoning, taken to its limits,
can lead to bans on members of the public wearing religious clothing
in public buildings—and possibly in the streets—and is difficult to
reconcile with the idea that individuals have the right to manifest
their beliefs in public through observance. The Grand Chamber
decision in Lautsi pointed to a different approach that could
conceivably lead in a different direction when it suggested that the
19. The leading cases remain Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. 447, and Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand
Chamber 2005), which though not entirely ad idem, have both been routinely applied by the
Court in subsequent cases such as Dogru v. France, App. No. 31645/04, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8
(2008), and Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008).
20. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber 2011). For a
series of short explorations of Lausti from a variety of perspectives, see 6 Religion and Human
Rights 203–285 (2011). See also the collection of essays in THE LAUTSI PAPERS:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
CLASSROOM (Jeroen Temperman ed., 2013).
21. The leading case on this remains Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No.
45701/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 123 (2001). For an examination of this approach see
Malcolm Evans & Peter Petkoff, A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 36 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 205
(2008).
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obligation upon States to be neutral and impartial does not
necessarily require the public realm—in this case, a public school
room—to be “free” of religion. 22 It remains to be seen whether this
does or does not result in a recalibration of the symbols debate. But
once again, this illustrates the propensity for the issues concerning
the relationship between “religion and . . .” (in this case, in the final
analysis, public life) to achieve prominence in public and in rightsbased discourse.
Since Lautsi there has also been Eweida v. United Kingdom, 23
which may or may not yet again have altered the parameters within
which balances may be struck. This is not a question that needs to be
pursued here. What is important is that this remains the basic
approach––working out what lies with the State and what lies with
the European Court when determining where the balance is to be
struck, couched in terms of neutrality (however understood).
B. The Baseline Issues
Some issues relating to the freedom of religion, however, do not
seem to attract the same degree of attention as issues concerning
films, books, clothes, and symbols. Recent influential studies have
pointed to a clear correlation between those countries in which there
are significant governmental and social restrictions upon the freedom
of religion and high levels of religious persecution and conflict. 24 As
reflected in the title of the well-known book by Brian Grim and
Roger Finke, there is a price to pay for denying religious freedom. 25
If one looks at the subject matter of the case law of the European
Court, one of the recurring issues concerns the denial of legal
registration to many religious communities that are then unable to
22. This flows both from its reasoning in Lausti, App. No. 30814/06 Euro. Ct. H.R. at
¶¶ 60, 69, and from the more general result, which was to see the presence of such symbols as
falling within the margin of appreciation of the state.
23. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, &
36516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber) (joining four extremely contentious UK
domestic decisions). For comment on Eweida, see Megan Pearson, Article 9 at a Crossroads:
Interface Before and After Eweida, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 580 (2013); Mark Hill, Religious
Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of Strasbourg’s
Judgment in Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 191 (2013).
24. See Brian J. Grim, Religion, Law and Social Conflict in the 21st Century: Findings
from Sociological Research, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 249 (2012).
25. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011).
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own property or assert their rights as a community. 26 Others find
their meetings disrupted and their members intimidated or
arrested. 27 In other words, some of the most fundamental aspects of
the freedom of religion are violated on a routine basis. Yet the
presence of international human rights law does not appear to be a
particularly powerful counter foil to this. Although there have now
been many judgments by the European Court of Human Rights on
matters concerning registration of religious communities and the
need to respect the internal autonomy and property of religious
institutions, recent trends in legislation within numerous Council of
Europe member States have been towards imposing further
restrictions upon religious communities and religious believers rather
than lifting them. 28 The force of human rights thinking is not
noticeably blunting the edge of violence in the sphere of religion or
belief.
We need not pursue this thought further here. All that needs to
be noted is that all these violations—and very serious violations—are
not about the “freedom of religion and . . .” anything else at all.
There is no juxtaposition or clash of rights. There may be multiple
breaches—such as violations of the freedom of association,
expression, family life, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment,
or the right to life—but no “clashes.” In any realistic scale of
categorization these are, in fact, just about the enjoyment of the
freedom of religion or belief. Yet, perhaps this alone is just not
enough to attract attention, or protection of the right itself?
26. See, e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No.
45701/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.; Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No.
72881/01, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No.
18147/02, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v.
Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kimlya and Others v. Russia, App. Nos.
76836/01 and 32782/03, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.; Lang v. Austria, App. No. 28648/03,
2009 Eur. Ct. H.R.
27. See, e.g., 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and
Others v. Georgia, App. No. 71156/01, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; Öllinger v. Austria, App. No.
76900/01, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.; Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 10877/04, 2008
Eur. Ct. H.R.; Milanovic v. Serbia, App. No. 44614/07, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R.
28. See, for example, the critical reaction to the new Hungarian Constitution, which
entered into force in January 2012. According to an editorial in The Times entitled Back to
Autocracy, the Constitution “attempts to reimpose state regulation of religion by reducing the
number of acknowledged faiths and sects from 300 to 14 while denying any official place in
society for Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu congregations unless they have operated in Hungary
for at least 20 years.” Sam Coates & Roland Watson, Back to Autocracy, THE TIMES, Jan. 2,
2012, at 2.
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In the face of a rising tide of concern, the relative failure of the
machinery of international human rights protection to effectively
engage with the problems revealed has resulted in increased pressure
to address issues through political channels. There has been a
notable increase in the interest shown to freedom of religion issues
by the European Parliament and other organs of the EU 29 and by
the Parliamentary Council of Europe. 30 Likewise, there is increased
mobilization at the national level—the United States has long been
in the vanguard here, with the USCIRF, recently joined by Canada,
the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. 31 If some of the
most fundamental problems concerning the enjoyment of the
freedom of religion are not more energetically engaged in by the
machinery of the international human rights networks, there is every
likelihood that there may be a further politicization of a relationship
that is already highly—some might say dangerously—politicized. The
“solution” to these baseline problems is rapidly slipping through the
fingers of the organs of the international human rights community
who continue to obsess with minutiae: Will Rome burn while
Strasburg fiddles?
C. A Unifying Role of Respect?
Against this background, is there really a positive contribution
that can be made by viewing the interrelationship between religion
and human rights in a more holistic, mutually reflexive fashion, as
was suggested earlier? Certainly, a positive contribution is unlikely to
flow from a continuation of the ultimately sterile debates concerning
the primacy of one body of thinking, whether it be religious or
human rights, over the other. Nor is it likely to come from seeking
to identify a series of lowest common denominators on which both
29. See generally RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2010).
30. See, e.g., Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1987, ¶ 1.4 (2011) on
“Combating all forms of discrimination based on religion” (adopted November 25, 2011),
which evidences some dissatisfaction in the efficacy of the legal approaches, by asking that the
committee of ministers, “when supervising the execution of judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights concerning freedom of religion, notably those concerning registration of
religious communities and acts of violence based on religion, strive to ensure their speedy
execution.”
31. For an overview, see An Orphaned Right: A Report of the All Party Parliamentary
Group on International Religious Freedom, (2013), [hereinafter An Orphaned Right], available
at https://freedomdeclared.org/media/Article-18-An-Orphaned-Right.pdf.
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religious adherents and/or human rights advocates can agree. Nor,
indeed, is it going to come from the endless discussion of the
meaning of neutrality and—I am afraid to say—models of ChurchState relations (important though all these are in their own way).
It is, then, not a question of choosing, negotiating, or deciding
upon the nature of the relationship between religion and human
rights. Understandings and approaches change within religious and
within human rights thinking, and there is never going to be a fixed
and stable answer to the question of the relationship between them.
To seek to do so is to be aiming at an ever-moving target. Rather,
one needs to step back and seek to better understand the key
components of religion as a human right and then, bearing this in
mind, seek out the principles that should govern religion’s
interaction with other rights. This will not indicate what those
outcomes will be, and will certainly not ensure that there is a
consensus for those outcomes when they are decided upon. But it
should make it possible to find an approach to the protection of
religion as a human right, which coheres with human rights thinking
and that transcends the “either/or,” or “the religion and . . .”
questions that have become so dominant and so damaging. Such an
approach will not remove all tensions—it cannot—but it can address
many of the tensions that are the artificial product of the
inappropriate manner in which they are currently addressed.
This may not be as difficult as is seems. It remains instructive that
in the first cases to be determined by the European Court of Human
Rights concerning the interplay between religion and expression, the
Court swiftly identified a value that is not mentioned in either article
9 or in article 10, but which it thought offered a lens through which
to consider the question: the lens of mutual “respect.” As the Court
put it, “a State may legitimately consider it necessary to take
measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct, including the
imparting of information and ideas, judged incompatible with the
respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of
others.” 32 The key points emerging from the Court’s approach to
the intersection of the freedom of religion and the freedom of
expression are that both rights are of value and should be enjoyed to

32. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶ 48
(1993); see also Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), ¶ 47 (1994).
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the fullest extent possible without negatively impacting the
enjoyment of the rights of others. Mutual respect for the rights of
others regarding what is said and how it is said might suggest that
restraint would be welcome; but it is not for the State to be the
instrument of restraint unless there is a pressing social need to do so.
The value of this approach has recently been affirmed by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee in its latest General Comment No. 34 on
the freedom of expression. 33
There are lessons to be learned from the approaches adopted by
the European Court in this body of jurisprudence that are relevant to
other questions concerning the enjoyment of the freedom of religion
or belief as a part of the canon of human rights law: does the subject
matter of the contestation and of the outcomes the parties are
seeking to achieve evidence a mutuality of respect rather than an
assertion of right? Or—in simple language—just because you can
does not mean that you should? And is this not what balancing is,
ultimately, all about? It should be made clear that respect, in this
context, does not imply endorsement of, let alone agreement with,
the beliefs in question. Indeed, it may well be that a respectful
consideration will nevertheless result in the rejection of some
viewpoints as being simply unworthy of respect within the human
rights framework. 34 It will certainly mean that some views will be
responded to (and respected) in a way others might find unwelcome.
Nevertheless, a respect-based approach to rights has already emerged
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and
may well be worth exploring further as a means of meeting the
challenges we face.
The only thing I would insist upon is that we really have to do
something. It is both instructive and salutary to re-read the history of
the founding moments of the current human rights regime in the

33. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess., Gen. Comment No. 34 at 12,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) (“Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for
a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the
Covenant.”) (emphasis added).
34. See, for example, the decision of the Court in Norwood v. The United Kingdom,
App. No. 23131/03, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., and the Chamber judgment in Mouvement
Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 16354/06, ¶ 61 (Jan. 13, 2011), aff’d 2012-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 373, in which the Court went out of its way to hold open (though not decide) the
question of whether Raelian beliefs were to be considered within the scope of article 9 (though
the grounds for its hesitation are kept opaque). The Grand Chamber too avoided passing
comment on this issue (2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, ¶ 80).
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1940s. What shines through that history is the keen understanding
of the need to ensure adequate protection for religious freedoms if
the world were to be made a better, safer place. 35 Yet, to use the
words of the recent report by UK parliamentarians, it has become
the “orphaned right” 36 within that system—or at best a “residual
right”—its content determined by what is left when other rights have
been realized. Tragically, we are seeing the consequences—and I
would indeed suggest that respect might be able to assist us in
making sense of the human rights approach to the freedom of
religion today, and assist in making the human rights approach more
relevant to the problems that it needs to address.

35. See, for example, the illuminating narrative based on the work of Eleanor Roosevelt
in MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001), in which the significance of the freedom of
religion or belief is highlighted in a manner lacking in some of the more textually oriented
analyses, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, ‘THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999).
36. An Orphaned Right, supra note 31.
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